山东省青岛市人民政府


青岛市防治性病规定
市政府



第一条 为预防、控制和消除性病，保护人体健康，根据法律、法规的有关规定，结合本市实际情况，制定本规定。

第二条 本规定所称性病是指，艾滋病、淋病、梅毒、非淋菌性尿道炎、尖锐湿疣、生殖器疱疹、软下疳、性病性淋巴肉芽肿以及国家、省、市卫生行政部门确定的其他性传播疾病病种。

第三条 本规定适用于本市行政区域。

第四条 青岛市和各县级市、区卫生行政部门对辖区内的防治性病工作，实施统一监督管理。青岛市性病监测中心具体负责性病监测管理和性病防治业务技术指导。
青岛卫生检疫局依法负责对出入境人员的性病监测工作。

第五条 青岛市性病监测中心应当与各卫生防疫机构、各类医疗单位组成全市性病监测、防治网络。

第六条 青岛市性病监测中心和各卫生行政部门、卫生防疫机构、医疗单位应利用多种形式宣传性病危害、传播方式和防治知识。其他有关部门和单位应当配合。

第七条 医疗单位开设专科性性病诊断防治业务，须具备下列条件：
（一）具有性病防治专业技术人员；
（二）具有性病辅助诊断技术、设备和人员。
具备前款规定条件的医疗单位，须向所在县级市、区行政部门提出申请，经批准后，方可从事性病诊断防治业务。

第八条 个体医生开设专科性性病诊断防治业务，应具备本规定第七条第一款所列条件，经所在县级市、区卫生行政部门审查同意后，报青岛市卫生行政部门批准。

第九条 进行健康查体、应将性病检查作为必查项目。
对献血液、人体组织、器官等的人员、接受的医疗单位必须对其有无性病进行检查。对患有性病的，不得接受其献血液、人体组织、器官等。
医疗（预防、保健）单位对新生儿，必须在其出生后一小时内用1％硝酸银眼药水点眼。

第十条 公安机关对查获的卖淫、嫖娼人员及其他可能染患性病的人员，应进行性病检查。对查出患有性病的，须强制其接受治疗。

第十一条 劳动改造单位、劳动教养单位应在收押劳动改造人员、收容劳动教养人员时，对其进行性病检查。对查出患有性病的，须强制其接受治疗。

第十二条 民政部门对收容的流浪乞讨人员中可能患有性病的，应进行性病检查；对查出患有性病的，须强制其接受治疗。

第十三条 经青岛市人民政府批准实行婚前健康检查的地区，须将性病检查列为必查项目。申请结婚的当事人凭指定医疗单位检查证明办理结婚登记手续。婚姻登记机关对双方或一方患有性病未治愈的，不予登记、禁止其结婚。
对患性病未治愈的已婚者，计划生育主管部门不发给其准生证。

第十四条 宾馆、饭店、浴室、理发店等单位必须严格规章制度，加强管理，防止性病的传播和蔓延。

第十五条 性病患者应及时到从事性病诊断治疗业务的医疗单位或个体医生处诊断治疗。

第十六条 从事性病诊断治疗业务的医疗单位和个体医生对性病患者应进行规范性治疗。诊断治疗性病应严格执行各项管理制度和技术操作规程，防止性病的医源性感染；推广使用一次性治疗用品和注射器。
医疗单位和个体医生应为性病患者保守秘密。

第十七条 医疗单位和个体医生发现性病患者，须在二日内向所在县级市、区卫生行政部门报告。其中，发现艾滋病患者的，须立即报告青岛市卫生防疫站；发现淋病、梅毒患者的，须报告青岛市性病监测中心。
各县级市、区卫生行政部门应按青岛市卫生行政部门的要求，于每月底前，将诊断治疗性病患者的情况报青岛市性病监测中心。青岛市性病监测中心应按国家有关规定，将统计资料汇总上报。

第十八条 开展性病防治工作所需经费，列入当地卫生事业费计划；不足部分，卫生行政部门可向同级财政申请补助。医药部门应保证监测和医疗机构预防、诊断、治疗性病所需药物及器械的供应。

第十九条 从事性病预防、诊断、治疗、处置的卫生专业人员的保健津贴，按传染病防治人员的保健津贴标准执行。
性病检查、治疗收费标准按有关规定执行。

第二十条 对在性病防治工作及性病防治科研中做出显著成绩的单位和个人，给予表彰和奖励。

第二十一条 对违反本办法有关规定的医疗单位或个体医生，由青岛市或县级市、区卫生行政部门给予警告、责令停止违法行为的处理，并可按下列规定处以罚款：
（一）未经批准，开设专科性性病诊断治疗业务的，罚款二百元到一千元；
（二）发现性病患者不按规定报告的，罚款五十元至五百元；
（三）对献血液、人体组织、器官人员未作性病检查的，罚款五十元至五百元；造成严重后果的，罚款五百元至二千元；
（四）对接受婚前健康检查的人员，不作性病检查的，罚款五十元至一百元；
（五）对新生儿不用1％的硝酸银眼药水点眼的，每发现一例，罚款一百元。
对违反本办法有关规定的医疗单位的直接责任人，可并处五十元至二百元的罚款。
罚款上缴同级财政。

第二十二条 卫生行政部门作出行政处罚决定，应制作行政处罚决定书，并送达当事人。
当事人对卫生行政部门的行政处罚决定不服的，可以依照《行政复议条例》和《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》的规定申请复议和提起诉讼。

第二十三条 有关单位和个人违反本规定的行为，依照其他有关法律、法规规定应当给予处理的，由有关部门依法处理；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

第二十四条 本规定具体执行中的问题，由青岛市卫生行政部门负责解释。

第二十五条 本规定自发布之日起施行。



1992年12月30日
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.